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Abstract. 
 
Does any one psychological process give rise to visual awareness? One candidate is 
selective attention – when we attend to something it seems we always see it. But if 
attention can selectively enhance our response to an unseen stimulus then attention 
cannot be a sufficient precondition for awareness. Kentridge, Heywood & 
Weiskrantz (1999, 2004) demonstrated just such a dissociation in the blindsight 
subject GY. Here we test whether the dissociation generalizes to the normal 
population. We presented observers with pairs of coloured discs, each masked by 
the subsequent presentation of a coloured annulus. The discs acted as primes, 
speeding discrimination of the colour of the annulus when they matched in colour 
and slowing it when they differed. We show that the location of attention modulated 
the size of this priming effect. However, the primes were rendered invisible by 
metacontrast-masking and remained unseen despite being attended. Visual 
attention could therefore facilitate processing of an invisible and cannot, therefore, 
be a sufficient precondition for visual awareness. 
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1. General Introduction 
 
What makes us aware of the world we see? Introspection suggests that when we 
selectively attend to part of the visual scene we become aware of objects in that region. 
This was noted  by early empirical Psychologists (James, 1890; Wundt, 1912) who 
proposed a causal link between visual attention and awareness which remains part of 
many contemporary theories of visual awareness (e.g. Baars’ (1998) global workspace 
theory). The ability to select part of the visual world for enhanced processing makes 
adaptive sense. But need it be the case that all stimuli which benefit from this selective 
processing advantage necessarily reach awareness? Are visual attention and visual 
awareness really aspects of a single process or are there circumstances where one acts 
without giving rise to the other? 
Lamme (2003) has argued that phenomenal awareness might be independent of 
attention. Many stimuli might elicit phenomenal experience (akin to iconic memory), 
only those to which we attend engage access consciousness - capable of engaging 
working memory. Attention may not, therefore, be necessary for awareness per se. 
Recent evidence suggests that allocation of visual attention to a stimulus may not always 
be sufficient to render that stimulus consciously visible to the observer. In such 
circumstances the role of attention may be evident by virtue of a selective advantage in 
behavioural responses to attended stimuli despite the fact that those stimuli are not 
acknowledged.  
Two of us, working in collaboration with Larry Weiskrantz  (Kentridge, Heywood 
& Weiskrantz,1999, 2004) discovered the first evidence for just such an effect in a 
patient, GY, who has the neurological condition of ‘blindsight’ (Weiskrantz, 1986). 
Patients with ‘blindsight’ demonstrate preserved visual abilities in the absence of 
acknowledged awareness. They can, for example, guess whether a visual stimulus is 
presented in the first or second of two temporal intervals with remarkable accuracy 
despite denying that they see anything at all (e.g. Kentridge, Heywood & Weiskrantz, 
1997). The condition arises as consequence of damage to primary visual cortex or its 
immediate afferents when more anterior visual areas are spared. It is thought that residual 
visual function is mediated by visual pathways which bypass the route from the lateral 
geniculate nucleus to striate cortex such as those from the superior colliculus or pulvinar 
(Cowey & Stoerig, 1991). 
Using the classical Posner cueing paradigm (Posner, 1980) we were able to show 
that, as with normal observers, spatial cues speeded detection or discrimination of targets 
subsequently appearing in the cued location, compared with those appearing elsewhere. 
However, as is characteristic of ‘blindsight’, the patient steadfastly denied seeing the 
cued-targets. Given that the cue-dependent reaction-time advantage is an index of spatial 
attention we concluded that spatial attention is unlikely to a sufficient precondition for 
visual awareness. However, the demonstration of a similar dissociation in normal 
observers would add weight to the generality of this conclusion.  
 
2. Experiment 1 
 
 In order to test whether attention is sufficient for awareness in normal observers 
we combined the Posner paradigm with a means of rendering stimuli invisible to normal 
observers - metacontrast-masking (Breitmeyer, 1984). Metacontrast-masked stimuli have 
been shown, despite their invisibility, to act as effective primes in subsequent visual 
discrimination tasks (Schmidt, 2000; Breitmeyer, Ro & Singhal, 2004). By presenting 
two different masked primes simultaneously, the effects of attentional cueing can be 
determined by comparing the efficacy of primes in cued and uncued locations.  
Pairs of red and green discs, the primes, were presented, rapidly followed by 
masking annuli, which were both either red or green and served as the discriminanda. The 
speed at which participants signal the colour of a target annulus will be determined by 
whether the annulus is of a congruent or incongruent colour to the unseen prime. A 
symbolic spatial cue (an arrow) was used to direct attention to one or other of the targets. 
Since both targets were identical in colour, if the cue has an effect on discrimination 
reaction time it can only have done so by differentially affecting the processing of the 
unseen primes. 
 
2.1 Method 
 
2.1.1 Participants 
Four participants (one male, three female, aged between 18 and 25) who were 
naïve as to the purpose of the experiment, but otherwise experienced observers, were 
tested.  
 
2.1.2 Stimuli and apparatus 
The visual display consisted of a Taxan Ergovision 885LR 14” colour monitor 
driven at 100Hz, with a resolution of 800x600 pixels, by a Cambridge Research Systems 
VSG2/5 stimulus generator and gamma corrected using a Cambridge Research Systems 
ColorCal colourimeter. The display used a P22 short-persistence phosphor to avoid 
potential display artefacts.  
Stimuli were composed of metacontrast-masked 0.8
O
 discs which served as 
primes. These primes were masked by subsequently presented annuli. These masking  
annuli surrounded the discs (their inner diameter matched the outer diameter of the discs, 
0.8
O
, their outer diameter was 1.6
O
) and were the targets to which subjects were asked to 
respond. Discs and Annuli were either a very desaturated red or green (~ 4.6% in cone-
contrast) with co-ordinates in CIE 1976 u’,v’ colour space of 0.196, 0.477 and 0.226, 
0.477, respectively. They were presented against a grey background (u’, 0.211; v’, 
0.477). The stimuli and background were equiluminant (20cdm
-2
). The red and green 
stimuli were equally salient to the extent that they deviated from grey by +/-0.015 in u’,v’ 
space which is a reasonable approximation of a linear discrimination space. By using low 
contrast stimuli with a brief 40ms interval between disc and annulus, potential problems 
with phosphor persistence were eliminated (see García-Pérez & Peli, 2001). 
The two possible stimulus locations were centred 1.6
O
 above and below fixation 
(a black central disc with a diameter of 0.16
O
 present throughout the experiment). 
Arrowheads, which acted as cues for spatial attention, were black, centred around 
fixation with a width of 0.4
O
 and a height of 0.2
O
. 
 
2.1.3 Design and procedure 
Participants were seated 57cm from the display in a dark room. A trial consisted 
of the presentation of a central cue, followed by a pair of primes embedded in the 
subsequently displayed annular targets. Participants were asked to indicate, as rapidly as 
possible while maintaining accuracy, the colour of the annuli by pressing one of two 
buttons on a button box. Reaction times (RTs) from annulus onset to response were 
collected. Participants were instructed to maintain fixation throughout. Fixation was 
monitored with an infrared video camera mounted above the monitor on which the 
experiment was presented. The stimulus sequence is illustrated in Figure 1a. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
As there are two identical targets in the cued and uncued locations the subject 
might ignore the ostensibly uninformative spatial cues. To ensure that subjects do indeed 
use the cues, we embedded the critical dual target trials described above within a much 
larger number of single target trials in which the symbolic cue indicated the likely 
location of the upcoming target with 80% accuracy (see figure 1b). Participants were 
informed that on some trials two targets would be presented but both targets would 
always be the same colour as one another. They were also told that each trial would start 
with the presentation of a centrally located arrow which was a good, but not perfect, 
predictor of the location of the target on single target trials. No mention was made to the 
subjects of the fact that the experiment also involved priming or that all targets were 
preceded by primes.  
Testing was conducted in 10 blocks, each of 280 trials. Within each block there 
were 56 double-target trials, 28 in which the cue pointed to the location of a congruent 
prime and 28 in which it pointed to an incongruent prime. Single targets were presented 
in the remaining 224 trials, in 196 of which the target location was correctly indicated by 
the cue (valid) and in 28 the cue was misleading (invalid). We treat the first 5 blocks as 
practice and only analyse the final 5 blocks for each subject. Separate analyses were 
conducted for single and dual target trials for each subject. Outliers (RTs>2 s.d. from the 
mean) and errors were discarded from all analyses. 
A final methodological point to address is the question of how awareness, a 
subjective phenomenon, should be measured. One option is to use psychophysical 
methods such as signal detection analyses or two-alternate forced choice procedures in 
order to determine whether observers are, in fact, detecting apparently invisible stimuli. 
Such approaches might, however, only inform us as to whether the subject has access to 
information about stimuli, not whether those stimuli reach awareness. It is clear that we 
need to obtain a direct subjective report from our subjects whether or not other 
approaches are also taken. There is, however, a danger that when one simply asks a 
subject about their experiences the experimenter’s expectations might influence the 
subjects’ reports. We therefore adopted a protocol in which the initial questions asked of 
the subject were wholly non-directive and were followed up by questions successively 
increasing in direct reference to the experience under investigation. We therefore assess 
the subjects’ cued and uncued recall of experience in queries which could reasonably be 
seen as both suggesting the likely absence and likely presence of possibly unseen stimuli. 
 
2.1.4 Results and Discussion 
Reaction-times for correct responses from the single target trials are shown in 
figure 2. Data were analysed by Analyses of Variance with the Factors of Cue Validity 
and Prime Congruency. The clear effect of Cue Validity is evident for all subjects (all F 
ratios > 39 with all dfs > 1,1000, maximum p<10
-9
). The effects of Prime Congruency 
and its interaction with Cue Validity are not consistent across subjects. Prime 
Congruency fails to reach significance for subject IS and the Prime Congruency x Cue 
Validity interaction fails to reach significance for both IS and BJ. It appears, nevertheless, 
that there is a consistent effect of priming for validly cued, but not invalidly cued, trials 
across subjects. This is confirmed by analyses of simple main effect of priming for cued 
and uncued trials. Priming has non-significant effects on uncued trials for all subjects (all 
Fs<1) but highly significant effects on cued trials (all Fs > 33 with all dfs > 1,890, 
maximum p<0.0005). 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The key results, the reaction-times from the dual target trials are shown in figure 
3. There is a consistent highly significant effect of cueing across all four subjects (Fs = 
13.64, 7.26, 7.34 and 24.16 with 1 and 259, 257, 261 and 257 df respectively, p<0.0005, 
p<0.005, 0<0.0005, p<0.00001 respectively). The average error rate across all subjects 
was less than 1.6%, TN made the most errors with a rate of 2.3%. The error rates for 
incongruent trials were higher than those for congruent trials for all subjects. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Following the completion of testing subjects were systematically and individually 
debriefed. First, each was asked to describe everything they had seen on the display 
during the experiment. None mentioned the prime. The subjects were asked if they had 
any idea of the purpose of the experiment. They mentioned a number of possibilities (e.g. 
a study into carry over effects from preceding trials) but none suggested anything related 
to priming, subliminal stimuli or masking. They were then asked whether they might 
have seen anything else in addition to the fixation crosses, cues and rings (targets) that 
they had just described. Again, all four subjects maintained that they had seen nothing 
else displayed. They were then asked directly whether they had seen any coloured discs 
at the locations of the annuli centres just prior to the appearance of the annuli and again 
they denied seeing any primes. Finally, they were shown examples of the stimulus 
sequences slowed down by a factor of 10 so that the primes were now clearly visible. The 
subjects registered astonishment that such primes had been present throughout the 
thousands of trials they had just completed.  
The conclusion we draw is that in normal observers, just as in GY, spatial 
attention can selectively facilitate the processing of unseen stimuli without those stimuli 
eliciting awareness. Attention cannot be a sufficient precondition for awareness. 
 
3. Experiment 2 
 
There is one clear drawback to the debriefing procedure we used to assess 
subjects’ awareness of the masked primes. The debrief took place a short time after 
subjects had completed the experiment. It is therefore possible that they may have had a 
fleeting experience of the primes which had faded from memory by the time they were 
interviewed. One key advantage, therefore, of methods in which subjects are assessed on 
a trial by trial basis is that demands on memory are much lower. One might, for example, 
test whether subjects can discriminate between the presence and absence of primes 
explicitly in a signal detection or a two-alternate forced choice (2AFC) paradigm, as 
opposed to measuring their indirect effects via priming (see e.g. Dehaene et al,1998, for 
example, who use both debriefing interviews and an explicit detection task test to assess 
awareness). Although a forced-choice task does not explicitly test awareness, when 
performance is at chance it is reasonable to assume that it is extremely unlikely that a 
subject is having any experience of the stimuli whose presence or absence he or she 
cannot discriminate. On the other hand, if the subject can make an explicit discrimination 
it does not necessarily follow that that the subject is having a visual experience 
(blindsight subjects certainly deny having visual experiences while nevertheless 
performing visual 2AFC tasks with high levels of accuracy, see e.g. Kentridge, Heywood 
& Weiskrantz, 1997). Our second experiment uses the same stimuli as those employed in 
experiment 1 but now in a 2AFC task designed to assess subjects’ ability to detect the 
presence of primes immediately after they are presented on each trial.  
 
3.1 Method 
 
3.1.1 Participants 
The participants were those who had taken part in experiment 1. 
 
3.1.2 Stimuli and apparatus 
The apparatus was the same as that employed in experiment 1. The stimuli were 
identical to those used in experiment 1 apart from the manner in which they were 
presented, as described in the following design and procedure section. 
 
3.1.3 Design and procedure 
Following debrief, in which the nature of the cues had been demonstrated to them, 
our subjects were presented with stimuli similar to those they had seen in experiment 1. 
There were two key differences. First, in each trial two entire stimulus sequences 
(fixation, cue, SOA, prime, gap, mask) were seen with a brief tone indicating the start of 
the second sequence. In either the first or the second presentation no prime (or primes for 
dual target trials) was presented. The stimulus sequence in each interval was drawn 
randomly and independently from the original set. Interval 1 and 2 stimuli were therefore 
not usually identical – this ensures that the attentional cues remain informative in both 
intervals of the prime detection task. The second difference was that the subjects’ task 
was no longer mask-colour discrimination but rather a temporal 2AFC in which they 
were asked to indicate whether primes were present in the first or second interval. 
Testing was conducted in 5 blocks, each of 280 trials (1,400 trials, 2,800 trial 
sequences). The proportions of single and double target sequences and of validly- and 
invalidly-cued single target trials in the first intervals and second intervals of each block 
was unchanged from experiment 1. The order in which trials were presented in intervals 1 
and 2 were randomised separately in each block.  
 
3.1.4 Results and discussion 
The most critical tests to make are of discrimination in double-target trials. 
Accuracy and 95% binomial confidence intervals are shown for each subject in each 
condition for double-target trials in figure 4. It can be seen that all subjects’ 
discriminations in all conditions do not differ from chance (all binomial p>0.05).  
 
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
It might be argued that by concentrating solely on double-target trials we are 
discarding data from single-target trials which could valuably be used to test subjects’ 
awareness (or at least discrimination) of primes (even though the equivalent trials in 
experiment 1 were not suited to testing the effects of attention). We therefore pooled data 
from all single- and double-target trials for each subject in order to maximise statistical 
power. The means and 95% binomial confidence intervals are shown in figure 5. Again, 
discrimination performance does not differ from chance for any subject (all binomial 
p>0.05) even though we are now using 1,400 trials per subject. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
The results of this second experiment are consistent with the reports of our 
subjects during the interview phase of experiment 1. It is clear that, despite focussing 
their attention on locations in which primes appeared, masking was sufficiently effective 
to prevent those primes eliciting conscious visual experience. Attention is known to 
decreases the effectiveness of metacontrast masking (Boyer & Ro, 2007), however, our 
de-saturated, equiluminant colour stimuli have masked so well that even when attended 
they remained unseen. 
 
4. General Discussion 
 
The results from dual-target trials in experiment 1, which directly test our 
hypothesis, clearly indicate that spatial attention was modulating the effectiveness of 
priming. Although the interpretation of single target trials is clouded by the fact that 
attention is highly likely to modulate target processing as well as prime processing, such 
trials can still tell us something about the relationship between attention and awareness. 
The pattern of results again appears consistent with an attentional effect on prime 
processing because priming only had an effect at attended locations. These effects cannot 
be attributed to speed-error trade-offs since error rates were always higher for the slower 
incongruent priming condition. We can conclude that spatial attention, although clearly 
conferring a selective processing advantage on primes presented at a cued-location, did 
not engender visual awareness of those primes. This absence of awareness is evident both 
in the interview phase of experiment 1 and in the results of experiment 2. Hence spatial 
attention cannot be a sufficient condition for visual awareness and, moreover, visual 
attention and visual awareness cannot depend upon identical underlying neural processes. 
Although our results might seem surprising they can be seen as a combination of 
two well-accepted phenomena. First, masked stimuli which are undetected by observers 
have repeatedly shown to be effective primes. Second, attention has been shown to 
modulate priming in many ways (e.g. Logan (1980) who demonstrates effects of attention 
on Stroop-based tasks, Tipper and Cranston (1985) who showed that attention modulated 
negative-priming, amongst many others). Lachter, Forster & Ruthruff (2004) report an 
experiment in which the effectiveness of masked positive primes was modulated by 
spatial attention, using a lexical decision task to measure performance and interruption 
masks to manipulate awareness. As the authors point out, however, their “participants are 
certainly aware that something appears before the target. Even under these conditions, 
however, they are not consistently aware of what the prime is” (p. 896). In contrast, 
masking in our experiment did not merely prevent participants from discriminating the 
nature of the primes (red or green in our case). Instead, our subjects were completely 
unaware of the existence of primes and attention did not raise those primes into 
awareness. 
Following our findings with GY, other authors have found conditions in which 
attention facilitates behavioural tasks without eliciting awareness of target stimuli in 
normal observers. Kanai, Tsuchiya & Verstraten (2006) report an elegant experiment in 
which they used continuous flash suppression where a rapidly changing field of stimuli 
presented in one eye prevents stimuli presented in the other eye from reaching awareness. 
They found that feature-based attention, as evidenced by a modulation of the tilt after 
effect, modulated processing of masked stimuli. They did, not, however, find evidence 
that spatial attention could affect the processing of unseen stimuli. This result is at odds 
with the data we present here. There may, however, be a relatively simple explanation of 
this apparent contradiction. It is possible that the visual transients in the flash-suppression 
mask automatically capture spatial attention thereby interfering with the subjects’ 
attempts to voluntarily maintain attention at one location. In the feature-based variant of 
their task the items to which subjects must voluntarily attend are not in locations covered 
by the flash-suppression mask and may hence be less affected by it.  
Sumner, Tsai, Yu & Nachev (2006) have also demonstrated that attention can 
have significant behavioural effects without engaging awareness. They exploit the fact 
that stimuli which prime a specific motor response produce a negative priming effect 
(they slow responding) when the stimuli are perceptually weak (e.g. very low contrast), 
only producing a normal, positive, priming effect when they are strong. This negative 
compatibility effect is effector-specific, that is, primes that are associated with one 
particular means of responding (e.g. button pressing) will not inhibit responses made with 
other effectors (e.g. eye-movements). Sumner et al use this effect to distinguish two 
distinct effects of attention: first, attention may strengthen the perceptual strength of a 
stimulus; second, attention may strengthen the sensorimotor processing associated with 
the stimulus. Attention may well act in both ways. The question Sumner et al address is 
whether the effects of attention which do not engage awareness are sensorimotor. They 
showed that, with their experimental procedure, spatial attention significantly slowed 
responses in cued, as opposed to uncued, locations. That is, attention enhanced the 
sensorimotor-specific negative-compatibility effect. This then is evidence that attention 
affects sensorimotor processes independently of perceptual ones. As Sumner et al note 
(and, indeed, demonstrate experimentally), it does not, however, imply that attention acts 
only on sensorimotor processing to the exclusion of perceptual enhancement. Our results 
show attention facilitating positive effects of unseen primes. There are, of course, many 
procedural differences between our experiment and that of Sumner et al. For example, in 
our experiment the relationship between stimuli and response (red → press left, green → 
press right) might be seen as more spatially arbitrary than that used by Sumner et al (left-
pointing arrow → press left, right-pointing arrow → press right). Critically, however, 
metacontrast-masked colour primes appears to act at an early sensory stage of processing 
(Breitmeyer, Ro & Singhal, 2004) and so are much less likely to be exerting their primary 
effect by influencing response programming. In any case, there is not necessarily a 
contradiction here. Attention may facilitate either perceptual or sensorimotor processes 
and, on the basis of our result here, either type facilitation can occur without necessary 
concomitant awareness.  
There are, then, many lines of evidence, including the results presented here, 
suggesting that attention, be it spatial or feature-based, can modulate the processing of 
stimuli without those stimuli necessarily entering awareness. The fact that attention can 
be selective for space or for features and that it can enhance sensorimotor links or 
perceptual processing, all without concomitant awareness, suggests that far from being 
intimately linked, the neural processes underlying attention and underlying visual 
awareness must be quite distinct. It is clear that, rather than being isolated to a single 
neuropsychological case, as might have been thought following our work with Larry 
Weiskrantz on patient GY, these dissociations generalise to the normal population.    
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 Figure Legends 
 
Figure 1. (a) A dual target trial. In this example the congruent prime location is cued. (b) 
Single target trials with validly cued congruent and incongruent primes are shown in 
upper and lower panels on the left while examples of invalidly cued trials are shown on 
the right. 
 
Figure 2. Reaction times to single target stimuli for each subject (error bars are +/- sem). 
 
 
Figure 3. Reaction times to dual target stimuli for each subject (error bars are +/- sem). 
 
Figure 4. Proportion of double-target trials for each subject in which they correctly 
identify in which of two 2AFC intervals primes are present. Error bars are 95% binomial 
confidence intervals.  
 
Figure 5.  Proportions of all trials for each subject in which they correctly identify in 
which of two 2AFC intervals primes are present. Error bars are 95% binomial confidence 
intervals. Note magnified scale. 
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